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ABSTRACT 
Ex-felons are routinely denied the right to vote after successful completion of their sentences.  Over six million 
people are currently denied the right to vote because of a prior felony conviction.  This undermines the principles of 
democracy, the goals of the criminal justice system, and the political process.  In Richardson v. Ramirez, the 
Supreme Court found an express textual warrant for denying the right to vote to those convicted of crimes in 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This Article argues that people of color are disproportionately impacted 
by felony disenfranchisement laws because of the disproportionate impact of mass incarceration on communities of 
color.  This Article then examines the tools voting rights advocates use to challenge felony disenfranchisement laws, 
including state constitutions, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause.  It ultimately 
concludes that these tools have failed to produce widespread, replicable success because courts generally require a 
showing of intentional racial discrimination, which is difficult to prove.  Further, there is a circuit split as to 
whether the Voting Rights Act applies to felony disenfranchisement laws.  Because of the inadequacies of the 
available legal tools, this Article concludes that Congress should adopt a federal statute which provides that states 
cannot disenfranchise people on the basis of a prior felony conviction or prior felony convictions for which they have 
completed their sentences.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Once you’re labeled a felon, the old forms of discrimination—employment 
discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of the right to vote, denial of 
educational opportunity, denial of food stamps and other public benefits, and 
exclusion from jury service—are suddenly legal.  As a criminal, you have scarcely 
more rights . . . than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow.  
— Michelle Alexander1 
 “1994.  Miami.  I was snatching a gold chain.  And I did 31 months.”2  
Justin was sixteen years old at the time.3  In Florida, prior to the November 
2018 elections, during which Florida voters approved a constitutional 
amendment that restored voting rights to over one million people with prior 
felony convictions,4 ex-felons had to petition the state government in order 
to restore their voting rights.5  After a mandatory waiting period, Justin filed 
to restore his right to cast a ballot in 2004.6  Not long after he filed to restore 
his voting rights, Justin earned a master’s degree in accounting and found a 
stable job.7  In 2015, after waiting nearly eleven years to see the clemency 
 
 1 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 2 (2d ed. 2012).  
 2 Renata Sago, Ex-Felons Fight to Restore Their Right to Vote, NPR (Dec. 11, 2015, 5:22 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/12/11/459365215/ex-felons-fight-to-restore-their-right-to-vote.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida.  
 5 Sago, supra note 2.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Id.  
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board, his voting rights were finally restored.8  Kelli Griffin, a mother of four 
in Iowa, lost her right to vote in 2008 after a conviction for a nonviolent drug 
offense.9  In 2013, on Election Day, she registered to vote and cast her ballot 
in a local election.10  Two months later, she was arrested and charged with 
voter fraud.11  Her defense attorney at the time of her conviction told her 
that she would be eligible to vote after she served her probation, which was 
true at the time.12  Then, the law changed so that all people with a felony 
conviction on their record in Iowa lose their voting rights permanently.13  She 
told the local county attorney that she did not know about the law change, 
but her case was not dismissed, and a jury acquitted her after forty minutes.14  
Although Griffin still cannot vote, she says she is a changed person and that 
she should “be able to vote in things regarding [her] child’s school, regarding 
[her] community, regarding things [that are] happening in [her] life because 
it affects [her].”15 
 In spite of popular misconceptions about who is affected by felony 
disenfranchisement laws, the President of the Florida Rights Restoration 
Coalition, Desmond Meade, notes that “[w]hen you think of the typical 
person that cannot vote . . . it’s not the African-American guy who murdered 
a million people.  It’s not that crazed killer or rapist, no . . . [t]he typical 
person who cannot vote was, probably years ago, convicted of some low-level 
offense.”16  According to a report by The Sentencing Project, “6.1 million 
Americans are forbidden to vote because of ‘felony disenfranchisement,’ or 
laws restricting voting rights for those convicted of felony-level crimes.”17  
The problem is pervasive:  one out of every forty adult citizens or 2.5 percent 
of the total U.S. voting age population is unable to vote because of a current 
 
 8 Id.  
 9 Griffin v. Pate, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June 30, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/cases/griffin-v-
pate.  
 10 Kelli Jo Griffin, I Was Arrested for Voting, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/i-was-arrested-voting.  
 11 Id.  
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id.  
 15 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mom Arrested for Voting in Iowa, YOUTUBE (Nov. 7, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?15=&v=1uAZTAX0Jp4.   
 16 Sago, supra note 2.  
 17 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS:  STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf (quotation marks omitted).   According to The Sentencing 
Project, this number has increased drastically in recent years.  Id.  In 1976, there were only 1.17 
million people similarly disenfranchised, and, in 1996, there were only 3.34 million.  Id.   
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or past felony conviction.18  Although currently only three states permanently 
disenfranchise all people with prior felony convictions,19 numerous other 
states disenfranchise at least some people with criminal convictions.20  In 
total, approximately a third of all states deny voting rights to some or all of 
those who have successfully completed their sentences, “unless they obtain 
reinstatement of voting rights.”21  
 Additionally, there is a disparate impact on black Americans specifically.  
Over 7.4 percent of African-Americans are disenfranchised.22  One out of 
every thirteen African-Americans is unable to vote, a number which is four 
times higher than the disenfranchisement rate of non-African-American 
voters.23  Only 1.8 percent of non-African-American voters are unable to 
vote, or one out of every fifty-six non-black voters.24  
 This Article examines felony disenfranchisement laws in the United 
States, including analyses of the various tools used by attorneys to challenge 
felony disenfranchisement statutes.  This Article also considers the 
weaknesses of each of those tools and the importance of finding new and 
innovative ways to use those tools to challenge felony disenfranchisement 
laws through the courts.  This Article further considers the importance of 
alternate routes of advocacy outside of the courtroom through the legislative 
branch and the political process, ultimately concluding that legislation is 
necessary to re-enfranchise citizens whose ability to vote is unfairly withheld 
by their states’ laws.  
 
 18 Id.   
 19 Chris Kenning, Locked Out: Critics Say it’s Time to End Kentucky’s Ban on Felon Voting, LOUISVILLE 
COURIER J. (Nov. 12, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2018/11/ 
11/kentucky-among-last-permanently-ban-felons-voting-rights/1924690002/.  The state 
constitutions of Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia permanently disenfranchise all people with felony 
convictions unless the government provides an individual pardon.  Editorial, Florida Restored Voting 
Rights to Former Felons.  Now the GOP Wants to Thwart Reform, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2019), 
https://wapo.st/2FoflYh.  Notably, Virginia’s former Governor, Terry McAuliffe, signed an 
executive order which restored voting rights to former felons in Virginia who had completed their 
sentences, but the Virginia Supreme Court held that the executive order violated their state 
constitution.  Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 724 (Va. 2016).  Still, during Governor 
McAuliffe’s four-year term, he restored voting rights to nearly 200,000 ex-felons.  Editorial, Virginia 
Should Do More to Restore Felons’ Voting Rights, VIRGINIAN–PILOT (Nov. 12, 2018), 
https://pilotonline.com/opinion/editorial/article_1ddcf28c-e3bd-11e8-9a7f-270adefbc95c.html.  
 20 Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Dec. 21, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx/. 
 21 DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 30–31 (2013).  
 22 UGGEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 3. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.; Felony Disenfranchisement, SENTENCING PROJECT http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/ 
felony-disenfranchisement/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).  
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 Part I examines the history of felony disenfranchisement laws and 
analyzes Richardson v. Ramirez,25  the landmark Supreme Court decision that 
upheld the practice of disenfranchising felons, even those who have 
completed their sentences.  Part II examines the effect of mass incarceration 
on voting rights, including an analysis of the disparate impact of felony 
disenfranchisement laws on people of color.  This Part concludes that the 
rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system in a democracy are best 
served by promoting true reintegration into society through active 
citizenship, including voting.  
 Part III then explores litigation challenging felony disenfranchisement 
laws since Richardson v. Ramirez.  This Part analyzes the ways in which various 
courts have ruled in response to those challenges, including challenges under 
state constitutions, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.  Part IV ultimately 
argues that Congress should enact a federal statute which provides that the 
rights of citizens of the United States to vote in federal elections shall not be 
denied or abridged by the individual states on account of a prior felony 
conviction or prior felony convictions for which they have completed their 
sentences.  This Part notes that Congress may not have the authority to 
legislate regarding felony disenfranchisement but nonetheless concludes that 
federal legislation is the best option.  
I.  THE HISTORY OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 
 In Reynolds v. Sims, Chief Justice Warren wrote:  
Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all 
qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.  A consistent 
line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict 
the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear.  It has been repeatedly 
recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to 
vote . . . .26  
 As inspirational as Chief Justice Warren’s words may be, and as vital as 
the right to vote is in a representative democracy, it is important to note one 
phrase in particular: all qualified citizens to vote.  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the right to vote has allowed for several qualifications in 
determining eligibility to vote, and not everyone is qualified.  The 
Constitution does not affirmatively grant or deny anyone the right to vote, 
and, generally, the right to vote is restricted for “noncitizens, nonresidents, 
 
 25 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  
 26 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).  
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minors, people deemed incompetent, and [depending on state law,] people 
convicted of felonies.”27  Disenfranchising felons is not a new idea and is not 
unique to the United States.  The practice of felony disenfranchisement has 
a long global history.28  The following Sections examine the history of felony 
disenfranchisement laws and the Supreme Court case which established their 
constitutionality.  
A.  The Idea of Civil Death  
 The idea of “civil death” dates back to at least ancient Greece and 
Rome.29  Civil death deprived citizens of basic civil rights, including the right 
to vote, when they committed crimes and broke the social contract of a 
political body.30  In Greece, criminal offenders lost citizenship rights, 
“including the right to participate in the polis (polity).”31  In Rome, those who 
committed infamous crimes lost “the right to vote, participate in court 
proceedings, or defend the homeland.”32  Even after the fall of the Roman 
Empire, the practice remained popular throughout medieval Europe and 
eventually became part of English common-law tradition.33  Proponents of 
civil death statutes believed that they deterred undesirable, unlawful, and 
corrupt behaviors and served the retributive goals of a criminal justice 
system.34  
 Disenfranchisement laws were also used in colonial-era America, 
although it is unclear how well-enforced or prevalent they were.35  One 
disenfranchisement statute in Connecticut stated that “if any person within 
these Libberties have been or shall be fyned or whipped for any scandalous 
offence, hee shall not bee admitted after such time to have any voate in 
Towne or Commonwealth, nor to serve in the Jury, until the courte shall 
 
 27 TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 13.   
 28 Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon 
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559, 562 (2003). 
 29 See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 16 (2006) (discussing 
the Greek and Roman practices of “infamia” which subjected to “civil death” members of the polity 
who committed crimes); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 23 (2008) (describing the “civil death” 
practices of Ancient Greece and Rome and Medieval Europe); KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, 
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA 28–29 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the evolution of the 
Roman practice of “infamia”). 
 30 HULL, supra note 29, at 16; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 23; PETTUS, supra note 29, at 28. 
 31 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 23.  
 32 HULL, supra note 29, at 16. 
 33 Id.; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 22.  
 34 HULL, supra note 29, at 16; Behrens et al., supra note 28, at 562.  
 35 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 24.  
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manifest theire satisfaction.”36  Massachusetts denied the right to vote for 
“any shamefull and vitious crime.”37  Maryland imposed loss of political 
rights as a punishment for “multiple incidences of public drunkenness.”38  
Virginia also had a law forbidding former felons from exercising the right to 
vote,39 and disenfranchisement laws ultimately became common; “[b]efore 
the Civil War, nineteen of the thirty-four states in the Union had adopted 
[legislation to prevent ex-felons from voting], and by 1869 twenty-nine had 
done so.”40 
 During the formative years of the United States, only white male 
property owners were allowed to vote; thus, it is clear that the early versions 
of “civic death” statutes were not motivated by racial animus.41  However, 
after the Civil War, legislators responded to the extension of the right to vote 
to black males through the Reconstruction Amendments by adopting new 
disenfranchisement laws or creating harsher disenfranchisement laws, 
seeming to purposefully restrict voting rights of black Americans.42  Between 
1890 and 1910, many states in the South held “disenfranchising” 
constitutional conventions43 at which they adopted new laws aimed at 
disenfranchising black voters, including felony disenfranchisement laws, 
“literacy tests, grandfather and ‘understanding’ clauses, property 
qualifications, and poll taxes.”44  
 According to “the president of Alabama’s all-white 1901 convention,” 
“the purpose of these various measures . . . was ‘within the limits imposed by 
the Federal Constitution to establish white supremacy.’”45  In 1901, Alabama 
altered its state constitution and added “wife-beating” to the list of crimes 
which warranted disenfranchisement.46  One legislator reasoned that “[t]he 
crime of wife-beating alone would disqualify 60 percent of the Negroes.”47  
 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 HULL, supra note 29, at 17.  
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. at 17–18.  
 42 See id. at 18 (citing statistical analysis that shows most of the disfranchisement laws adopted after the 
Civil War were adopted as a result of backlash against the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment); 
Behrens et al., supra note 28, at 566–68 (showing a massive increase in the number of states that 
disenfranchise, and that disenfranchise felons in the run up to, as well as after, the Civil War). 
 43 PETTUS, supra note 29, at 34. 
 44 HULL, supra note 29, at 18; PETTUS, supra note 9, at 34.  
 45 HULL, supra note 29, at 18.  
 46 Id. at 20.  
 47 Editorial, A Meaningful Move on Voting Rights in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/opinion/alabama-governor-felons-voting.html; see also 
 
1078 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:4 
   
 
In 1877, Georgia added a “moral turpitude” clause to the disenfranchising 
clause of its state constitution.48  In Mississippi, nearly three-quarters of 
eligible black voters were registered voters in 1867.49  However, after the state 
adopted its new criminal code, the number of eligible registered black voters 
dropped to less than six percent.50  At Mississippi’s constitutional convention 
in 1890, the legislature “replaced an 1869 provision disenfranchising citizens 
convicted of ‘any crime’ with a narrower one barring only those found guilty 
of certain petty offenses for which [they believed] blacks had an apparent 
proclivity.”51  Further, Mississippi allowed convicted rapists and murderers 
to exercise the right to vote, along with those convicted of “‘robust’ crimes to 
which whites were susceptible.”52  However, those convicted of “‘furtive 
offenses’ to which blacks were reputedly inclined—such as bribery, perjury, 
bigamy, or miscegenation—forfeited their voting privileges into 
perpetuity.”53  Thus, for nearly a hundred years, those convicted of rape and 
murder could exercise the right to vote in Mississippi, but those convicted of 
violating the ban against interracial marriage could not.54  In 1850, only 
about a third of states prevented ex-felons from voting.55  By 1920, more than 
three-fourths of states had adopted felony disenfranchisement laws.56  
However, in spite of the prevalence of felony disenfranchisement statutes and 
circuit court splits on their legality, the Supreme Court did not address felony 
disenfranchisement laws or constitutional provisions directly until 1974.57  
 
 
HULL, supra note 29, at 20.  
 48 PETTUS, supra note 29, at 34.  
 49 HULL, supra note 29, at 21 (“Almost 70 percent of eligible blacks were registered to vote in 
Mississippi in 1867 . . . .”).  
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. at 19. 
 52 Id.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. at 22.  
 56 Id.  
 57 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974).  In 1885, the Supreme Court indirectly addressed 
felony disenfranchisement by unanimously upholding the Edmunds Act, “which outlawed bigamy 
and polygamy in the territories and disenfranchised anyone convicted of either.”  MANZA & 
UGGEN, supra note 29, at 28 (describing Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55, 59, 79 (1885)).  In 1890, 
the Supreme Court upheld an Idaho state constitutional provision which “allow[ed] the state to 
disenfranchise bigamists.”  MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 28–29 (describing Davis v. Beason, 
133 U.S. 333, 347 (1890)).  The Court concluded that the Idaho statute was “not open to any 
constitutional or legal objection.”  Davis, 133 U.S. at 347.  
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B.  Affirming States’ Rights to Punish in Perpetuity 
 In Richardson v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court issued a six-to-three opinion 
written by Justice Rehnquist in which it upheld disenfranchising provisions 
of the California Constitution and several sections of the California Elections 
Code that disenfranchised felons.58  The Court reversed the California 
Supreme Court’s decision applying strict scrutiny to the California 
restrictions which held that “the enforcement of . . . statutes regulating the 
voting process and penalizing its misuse—rather than outright 
disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crime—[was] . . . the method of 
preventing election fraud which [was] the least burdensome” on the right to 
vote.59  According to the California Supreme Court, denying the right to vote 
to “ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole [had] expired” violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.60  However, the 
Supreme Court focused on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
notes that representation for states that deny the right to vote to male citizens 
“except for participation in rebellion, or other crime . . . shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the 
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”61  The 
Court accepted the defendant’s argument that “those who framed and 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to prohibit 
outright in [Section 1] of that Amendment that which was expressly 
exempted from the lesser section of reduced representation imposed by 
[Section 2] of the Amendment.”62  The Court also noted that, at the time of 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, over half of the states included 
provisions in their state constitutions that disenfranchised those convicted of 







 58 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26–31.  
 59 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357 (Cal. 1973), rev’d sub nom. Richardson, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  
 60 Id.  
 61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 62 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43.  
 63 See id. at 48 (“[A]t the time of the adoption of the Amendment, 29 States had provisions in their 
constitutions which prohibited, or authorized the legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise 
by persons convicted of felonies or infamous crimes.”).   
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 The Court examined the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, noting that the legislative history of Section 2 was scarce but 
also that “[w]hat little comment there was on the phrase in question . . . 
support[ed] a plain reading of it.”64  Even though several alterations to the 
language of Section 2 were suggested during the floor debates in the House 
and the Senate, “the language ‘except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime’ was never altered.”65  Still, the Court noted the lack of relevant 
legislative history.  Although the wording of Section 2 was discussed at length, 
“most of the discussion was devoted to its foreseeable consequences in both 
the Northern and Southern States, and to arguments as to its necessity or 
wisdom.”66  
 The Court also noted that a legislative solution was more appropriate 
than a judicial one to address the issue of felony disenfranchisement, stating 
that “it is not for [the Court] to choose one set of values over the other.”67  
The Court reasoned that if a “more modern view is that it is essential to the 
process of rehabilitating the ex-felon that he be returned to his role in society 
as a fully participating citizen,” then the Court would not “discount [those] 
arguments if addressed to the legislative forum which may properly weigh 
and balance them.”68  Thus, the Court held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment contains an express sanction of states’ rights to strip ex-felons of 
the right to vote.69  The Court reversed the Supreme Court of California’s 
judgment, concluding that the California court had erred in holding that 
California could not disenfranchise convicted felons who had completed 
their sentences.70  However, Justice Marshall wrote a fervent dissent, and 




 64 Id. at 45.   
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.   
 67 Id. at 55.  
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 54.   
 70 Id. at 56.  
 71 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the 
Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 
313–15 (2004); Anthony Gray, Securing Felons' Voting Rights in America, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. 
& POL’Y 3, 9–10 (2014); Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to 
Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1368–69 (2003); David J. Zeitlin, Revisiting Richardson v. Ramirez:  
The Constitutional Bounds of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement, 70 ALA. L. REV. 259, 281 (2018). 
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 Justice Marshall reasoned that voting is a fundamental right,72 noting 
that “neither the fact that several States had ex-felon disenfranchisement 
laws at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor that such 
disenfranchisement was specifically excepted from the special remedy of § 2, 
[could] serve to insulate such disenfranchisement from equal protection 
scrutiny.”73  He noted that there was minimal legislative history regarding 
“the crucial words ‘or other crime.’”74  He argued that the purpose of 
Section 2 was to create a remedy of reduced representation to address a 
specific problem, the denial of the right to vote to eligible black voters, and 
that just “because Congress chose to exempt one form of electoral 
discrimination from the reduction-of-representation remedy provided by § 2 
does not necessarily imply congressional approval of this 
disenfranchisement.”75  He stated that “[t]he ballot is the democratic 
system’s coin of the realm”76 and argued that there is no reason to think that 
“ex-felons have any less interest in the democratic process than any other 
citizen.  Like everyone else, their daily lives are deeply affected” by the 
government’s actions.77  He reasoned that modern equal protection 
jurisprudence is constantly evolving and that “laws are not frozen into 
immutable form, they are constantly in the process of revision in response to 
the needs of a changing society.”78  He also argued that felony 
disenfranchisement marginalizes ex-felons and conflicts with the 
rehabilitative goals of the criminal justice system.79  Thus, Justice Marshall 
concluded that “the blanket disenfranchisement of ex-felons” violated the 





 72 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that a State may 
strip ex-felons . . . of their fundamental right to vote without running afoul of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”).   
 73 Id. at 77. 
 74 Id. at 72–73.  
 75 Id. at 75. 
 76 Id. at 83. 
 77 Id. at 78. 
 78 Id. at 82. 
 79 See id. at 79 (“[T]he denial of the right to vote to such persons is a hindrance to the efforts of society 
to rehabilitate former felons and convert them into law-abiding and productive citizens.” (quoting 
Memorandum of the Sec’y of State of Cal. in Opposition to Certiorari, Class of Cty. Clerks & 
Registrars of Voters of Cal. v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 904 (1974) (No. 73-324))).  
 80 Id. at 86. 
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 Others have posed additional criticisms.  Section 2’s language mentions 
vaguely “participation in rebellion, or other crime,” but at the time the 
Framers adopted that language, the phrase was more commonly 
“understood to mean ‘such crimes as are now felonies at common law,’”81 
and common law felonies were narrower and fewer than the offenses which 
qualify as felonies today.82  Additionally, the Court’s opinion shows how a 
purely textualist approach to interpretation sometimes leads to absurd 
results.  The literal reading of Section 2’s language did not allow for the 
Court to take into account context or changing circumstances.83  The literal 
reading also failed to take into account the purpose behind the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was “to expand voting rights . . . not to allow the states to 
add new restrictions.”84  When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, it 
was “understood as seeking to turn vague natural rights into something 
concrete and defendable for African Americans, and to nationalize 
citizenship to override state-level biases.”85 
 Interestingly, in spite of the fact that Section 2’s language “was designed 
to encourage the former Confederate states to enfranchise African-
Americans by excluding former slaves from the state’s population for 
purposes of apportioning Congress if former slaves were denied the right to 
vote” after the Civil War, “no discriminating state [has ever] lost even a single 
seat in the House of Representatives.”86  No court has ever ruled to exclude 
disenfranchised black voters from a state’s population count, even though 
states in the South methodically and purposefully denied black people the 
right to vote for decades after Reconstruction, during Jim Crow and 
beyond.87  Thus, the representation-reducing language of Section 2 is 
 
 81 HULL, supra note 29, at 101 (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 51).  
 82 See, e.g., HULL, supra note 29, at 101; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 31 (“When the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, disenfranchisement applied only to those convicted of felonies at 
common law, a far more limited class of offenses than the modern conception of ‘felony.’”); John 
Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2001) (arguing that “[a]ll Section 2 tells 
us is that a state can deny felons the vote without opening itself to a congressional reduction of its 
representation in Congress”).  But see, e.g., Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice:  
Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1635–38 (2012) 
(noting that many radicals at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment endorsed 
criminal disenfranchisement but argued against disenfranchisement based on immutable 
characteristics such as race and class).  
 83 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 31. 
 84 Id. at 32. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Chin, supra note 71, at 259–60; Richard Kreitner, This Long-Lost Constitutional Clause Could Save the 
Right to Vote, NATION (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/any-way-abridged/.  
 87 Id.   
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essentially historical artifact88 and is not actually used to discourage states 
from discriminating against voters on the basis of race as was its original 
purpose.89  Instead, the Ramirez decision ironically allows Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to be used to disenfranchise potential voters, 
disproportionately people of color,90 the very group of people the Fourteenth 
Amendment originally aimed to protect.91  Ramirez essentially legalized 
discrimination, as long as the target of that discrimination has been convicted 
of a felony.92 
II.  FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT:  UNDEMOCRATIC, 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, AND DISCRIMINATORY 
 The United States imprisons its population at a higher rate than any 
other country in the world, even surpassing the incarceration rates of “highly 
repressive regimes like Russia, China, and Iran.”93  Germany incarcerates 93 
 
 88 Congress has never used the representation-reducing language to lessen representation when it 
apportions itself, and courts have declined to enforce the clause.  See, e.g., Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 
F.2d 235, 238 (4th Cir. 1945); Chin, supra note 71, at 274 n.84 (noting that the Section 2 Clause 
could be interpreted to force Southern States to choose between giving enfranchisement to all 
citizens or suffer reduced representation in Congress).  In 1945, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Case in which Saunders, a potential candidate for 
Congress, argued that Virginia’s representation in Congress should be reduced because of 
Virginia’s poll tax, which had the purpose and effect of discriminating on the basis of race.  Saunders, 
152 F.2d at 236–37.  Saunders alleged that if Virginia’s representation was reduced as it should be 
according to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then Virginia would be forced to elect its 
remaining members of Congress in an at-large election.  Id. at 236.  The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, holding that Saunders’ challenge presented a nonjusticiable 
political question which could only be decided by the legislative branch.  Id. at 237.   
 89 See, e.g., TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 17–18 (stating that while not explicitly protecting blacks in the 
Reconstruction South, the immediate passage of the Fifteenth Amendment suggests this intent); 
Chin, supra note 71, at 260 (stating that no court has ever declared that disenfranchised African-
Americans would be excluded from a state’s population from the Plessy era to present day).   
 90 See infra Section II.A.  
 91 See, e.g., TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 31 (explaining how the Supreme Court used the phrase “other 
crime” to uphold felony disenfranchisement under the Fourteenth Amendment); Chin, supra note 
71, at 259 (explaining how the second sentence of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
meant to “put Southern States to a choice—enfranchise Negro voters or lose congressional 
representation” (quoting Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 73–74 (Marshall, J., dissenting))).  
 92 See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 6.  
 93 Id.; see also Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Oct. 2014, at 56, 58; 
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up At a Higher Rate Than Any Other Country, WASH. POST 
(July 7, 2015), http://wapo.st/1fjs79L; Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other 
Nations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/ 
23iht-23prison.12253738.html. Even though the United States “has less than 5 percent of the 
world’s population . . . [i]t has almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners.”  Id. 
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out of every 100,000 children and adults.94  The United States’ incarceration 
rate is nearly eight times greater than Germany’s at a rate of 750 out of every 
100,000 children and adults.95  The United States also imprisons its racial 
and ethnic minorities at a rate higher than any other country in the world.96  
The United States is the only modern democracy which allows broad voting 
bans on ex-felons through state laws which disenfranchise former criminals 
seemingly irrespective of the types of crimes they committed.97  The following 
Section examines the United States’ felony disenfranchisement practices in 
light of mass incarceration, which places a large percentage of the United 
States population under control of the criminal justice system and 
disproportionately impacts people of color.  The next Section considers the 
goals of the criminal justice system and argues that felony disenfranchisement 
laws are counterproductive and undemocratic.   
A.  Mass Incarceration:  Legally Stripping Away the Voting Rights of People of Color 
 In June 1971, President Richard Nixon announced a war on drugs.98  In 
1973, President Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(“DEA”).99  In October 1982, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed his 
Administration’s commitment to the war on drugs, even though “at the time 
. . . less than 2 percent of the American public viewed drugs as the most 
important issue facing the nation.”100  President Reagan’s Administration 
increased Federal Bureau of Investigation anti-drug funding by nearly twelve 
times “from $8 million to $95 million.”101  Largely as a result of the war on 
drugs and the criminalization of nonviolent drug offenses, over the past few 
decades, the United States’ rates of incarceration have greatly increased: 
“between 1980 and 2000, the number of people incarcerated in [the United 
States’] prisons and jails soared from roughly 300,000 to more than 2 million.  
By the end of 2007, more than 7 million Americans . . . were behind bars, on 
probation, or on parole.”102  The United States incarcerates its population at 
 
 94 ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 6.  
 95 Id.   
 96 Id.  Notably, the United States incarcerates more “of its black population than South Africa did at 
the height of apartheid.”  Id.   
 97 Behrens et al., supra note 28, at 562 n.3.  
 98 Editorial, The War on Drugs, HISTORY, (May 31, 2017), http://www.history.com/topics/the-war-
on-drugs.  
 99 Id.   
 100 ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 49.  
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 60.   
[Most people] arrested for drug crimes are not charged with serious offenses, and most of 
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a rate “six to ten times” more than “other industrialized nations.”103  
 Mass incarceration has disproportionately impacted people of color, 
especially African-Americans and Latinos.  Even though white people are 
more likely than black people to sell drugs, black people are more likely to 
end up incarcerated for selling drugs.104  Black people are over five times 
more likely than white people to be incarcerated in state prisons throughout 
the United States, and in some states, the disparity between white and black 
people is even higher.105  Maryland’s prison population is nearly 75% 
black,106 even though black people only comprise about 30% of Maryland’s 
total population.107  Latinos “are imprisoned at a rate that is 1.4 times the 
rate of whites” in state prisons throughout the United States.108  In 
Massachusetts, Latinos are over four times more likely than white people to 
be imprisoned.109  In New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, Latinos are 
over three times more likely to face incarceration than white people.110 
 Because of felony disenfranchisement laws, the disparities in 
incarceration rates by race ultimately become disparities in voting rights.  
Regardless of the reasons for the disparities, if targeted criminal justice 
reforms are not made, the disproportionate impact on African-Americans 
and Latinos will only increase.111  If existing trends continue, “one in six 
 
the people in state prison on drug charges have no history of violence or significant selling 
activity.  Those who are “kingpins” are often able to buy their freedom by forfeiting their 
assets, snitching on other dealers, or becoming paid government informants.   
  Id. at 209.  
 103 Id. at 7–8.  
 104 Id. at 7; Christopher Ingraham, White People Are More Likely to Deal Drugs, but Black People Are More 
Likely to Get Arrested for It, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2014/09/30/white-people-are-more-likely-to-deal-drugs-but-black-people-are-more-
likely-to-get-arrested-for-it/.  
 105 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE:  RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-
of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/.   
 106 Id.  
 107 QuickFacts: Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MD (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2019).  
 108 Nellis, supra note 105, at 3.  
 109 Id.   
 110 Id.  
 111 See generally Marc Mauer, Justice for All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, 37 
HUM. RTS. 14–16 (Fall 2010) (explaining that criminal justice reform activists have put forth 
numerous hypotheses to explain the cause of racial disparities in the criminal justice system, 
including inequitable access to resources, legislation which disproportionately impacts black and 
brown people, overt racial bias, and higher crime rates); see also THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR 
PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS 5–9 (2008) (proposing there is a notable difference between 
rates of offending and rates of arrest); id. at 5 (arguing that figures which only report arrests “reflect 
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Latino men”112 and “[o]ne in three young African-American men will serve 
time in prison . . . and in some cities more than half of all young adult black 
men are [already] under correctional control—in prison or jail, on probation 
or parole.”113  Thus, because mass incarceration disproportionately affects 
African-Americans and Latinos, the voting strength of both groups is diluted 
because of felony disenfranchisement laws.114  
B.  How Felony Disenfranchisement Laws Undermine the Principles of Democracy and 
the Goals of the Criminal Justice System  
 In 1964, Justice Warren wrote “the right to exercise the franchise in a 
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights.”115  In a democracy, the right to vote is protective of all other rights.  
It is antidemocratic to “hold citizens to account for violating our laws while 
denying them a say over those laws.”116  Recognizing that disenfranchising 
large swaths of the population is undemocratic, Israel, Canada, South Africa, 
and other modern democracies around the world have recently restored 
voting rights to inmates and ex-inmates.117  Like the United States, South 
Africa has a history of segregation.118  The South African government’s 
policy of apartheid, which officially segregated white and nonwhite South 
Africans, officially ended in 1991.119  In 1999, the South African 
 
the frequency with which crimes are reported, police decisions regarding offenses on which they 
will concentrate their attention and resources, and the relative vulnerability of certain crimes to 
arrest.”); id. at 6 (noting that while some people allege that the racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system are because people of color commit more crimes, “empirical analyses do not support 
this claim”). 
 112 Mauer, supra note 111, at 14.  
 113 ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 9.  
 114 Id. at 9; see also id. at 4–9 (hypothesizing that mass incarceration and felony disenfranchisement laws 
“function . . . in a manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow.”); Lauren Handelsman, Giving the Barking 
Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1875, 1886 (2005) (explaining the history of disenfranchisement statutes that were implemented 
and enforced after the Civil War); Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the 
Black Vote: The Need for A Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1994) (“After such 
discrimination removes more blacks from society than whites, disenfranchisement serves to remove 
them from the ranks of black voter, the numbers of which are already comparatively lower than 
whites.”).  
 115 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
 116 Gideon Yaffe, Give Felons and Prisoners the Right to Vote, WASH. POST (July 26, 2016), 
http://wapo.st/2a7jHRD. 
 117 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 38 (comparing U.S. disenfranchisement with other countries). 
 118 See generally Apartheid, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/apartheid (last visited May 14, 
2019) (stating segregation in South Africa started long before Apartheid).  
 119 Id.   
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Constitutional Court wrote: 
The universality of the franchise is important not only for nationhood and 
democracy.  The vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity.  Quite 
literally, it says that everybody counts.  In a country of great disparities of 
wealth and power . . . exalted or disgraced, we all belong to the same 
democratic South African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a 
single interactive polity.120 
 Especially in countries like the United States and South Africa with 
histories of government-sponsored segregation, a democracy should be 
inclusive.  Ex-felons constitute a large group of people in the United States,121 
and their exclusion from the political process is undemocratic and unjust.  
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has even “charged that U.S. 
disenfranchisement policies are discriminatory and violate international 
law.”122  Without the ability to vote and make their voices heard, ex-felons 
will “continue to be denied decent housing, tuition vouchers, professional 
licenses, secured loans, and even some parental privileges until they are able 
to protect themselves through the electoral process.”123  Without the right to 
vote, ex-felons will continue to face marginalization in every facet of society 
through severe collateral consequences, which makes it extremely difficult 
for ex-felons, as a group, to reenter society.124 
 One of the primary goals of the criminal justice system is 
rehabilitation.125  A criminal justice system which is purely retributive 
“introduces offenders to long-term risks that . . . increase their chances of 
repeating the same problematic behaviors.”126  Effective rehabilitation has 
been shown to decrease recidivism by 10–25%.127  Felony 
disenfranchisement conflicts with the rehabilitative goals of the criminal 
 
 120 August v. Electoral Comm’n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 10 para. 17 (S. Afr.).  
 121 See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.  
 122 ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 158.  
 123 HULL, supra note 29, at 35–36.  One student comment proposed that ex-offenders should be treated 
as a suspect class, arguing that the political process failures which plague ex-offenders as a class 
make them politically powerless and especially vulnerable to prejudicial action by the government. 
Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 
1226–29 (2006) (describing the degree of discreteness and insularity of ex-felons).  
 124 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community 
Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 204–05 (2004) (showing the correlation between 
voting and incarceration). 
 125 See generally Mark R. Fondacaro et al., The Rebirth of Rehabilitation in Juvenile and Criminal Justice: New 
Wine in New Bottles, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 697 (2015); Beth M. Huebner, Rehabilitation, OXFORD 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0046.xml.  
 126 Fondacaro et al., supra note 125, at 710.  
 127 JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 41 (7th ed. 
2015).  
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justice system by discouraging civic participation.  Political theorist John 
Stuart Mill hypothesized that democracy promotes active citizenship and 
that regular participation in politics allows citizens to identify with society’s 
norms and values.128  Accordingly, restoring voting rights to ex-felons may 
“facilitate reintegration efforts” and perhaps even improve public safety.129  
 According to one study, there is a notable correlation between political 
participation and rates of arrest, incarceration, and recidivism: “[a]mong 
former arrestees, about 27% of . . . non-voters were re-arrested, relative to 
12% of . . . voters.”130  The authors of the study noted their small sample size 
and acknowledged that their ideas are “largely speculative” regarding voting 
and its connection to crime.131  Still, they argued that “[v]oting appears to be 
part of a package of pro-social behavior that is linked to desistance from 
crime” and that “the right to vote remains the most powerful symbol of stake-
holding in our democracy.”132  When ex-felons become engaged in their 
communities by participating in the political process, “there is [at least] some 
evidence that they will bring their behavior into line with the expectations of 
the citizen role, avoiding further contact with the criminal justice system.”133  
III.  CHALLENGING FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS: WHY 
LEGISLATION IS THE BEST ANSWER 
 Since Richardson v. Ramirez in 1974, voting rights advocates and criminal 
justice activists have attempted to utilize numerous tools to challenge felony 
disenfranchisement laws with little long-term, widespread, or replicable 
success, including the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on intentional 
racial discrimination, the Voting Rights Act134 (the “VRA”), and state 
constitutions.  However, all of these tools are inadequate and have failed to 
produce systemic change.  Thus, this Article argues that Congress should 
adopt a federal statute which provides that states cannot disenfranchise 
people on the basis of a prior felony conviction or prior felony convictions 
for which they have completed their sentences.  
 
 128 Uggen & Manza, supra note 124, at 198. 
 129 Id. at 194.  
 130 Id. at 205.  
 131 Id. at 195 (“Establishing a causal relationship between voting . . . and recidivism would require a 
large-scale longitudinal survey that tracked released felons in their communities and closely 
monitored changes in their political and criminal behavior.  At present, no such data exist.”).  
 132 Id. at 214–15. 
 133 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 29, at 163.  
 134 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
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A.  The Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
 In most challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws, plaintiffs make 
claims under both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
and Section 2 of the VRA.  Section 2 has been a “source of considerable—
and ultimately unsuccessful—litigation in recent years.”135  Section 2 was not 
particularly significant at first because it simply reaffirmed the guarantees of 
the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in voting.136  
Congress amended Section 2 in 1982 to include a “results” test which bars 
voting practices with racially discriminatory results with no intent 
requirement, which transformed Section 2 into a powerful tool in and of 
itself.137  The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the 
applicability of Section 2 of the VRA to felony disenfranchisement laws.138  
Thus, circuits are split as to how they apply it in the context of felony 
disenfranchisement lawsuits.139  
 The only successful challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws have 
been constitutional challenges based on intentional racial discrimination, 
specifically “claims of impermissible discrimination in the definition of 
disenfranchisement-triggering offenses.”140  Although challenges to felony 
disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection Clause have had more 
success than challenges under Section 2 of the VRA, the Equal Protection 
 
 135 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 887 (5th ed. 2016). 
 136 TOKAJI, supra note 21, at 26–27.  
 137 See generally id. at 112–36 (discussing the “results” test and successive cases interpreting it).  There 
are two types of Section 2 claims: 1) vote dilution claims and 2) vote denial claims.  Daniel P. Tokaji, 
The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 691 (2006).  
A vote dilution claim addresses “practices that diminish minorities’ political influence in places 
where they are allowed to vote.  Chief examples of vote-dilution practices include at-large elections 
and redistricting plans that keep minorities’ voting strength weak.”  Id.  A vote denial claim 
addresses “practices that prevent people from voting or having their votes counted. . . .  [E]xamples 
[include] literacy tests, poll taxes, all-white primaries, and English-only ballots.”  Id.  Voting rights 
advocates continue to find new and innovative ways to utilize the VRA.  Id.  “The first generation 
of VRA enforcement focused mainly on vote denial, while the second generation . . . focused mainly 
on vote dilution.  The application of the VRA to practices such as felon disenfranchisement, voting 
machines, and voter ID laws represents a new generation of VRA enforcement.”  Id. at 691–92. 
 138 See Tokaji, The New Vote Denial, supra note 137, at 700–01 (noting that three federal courts of appeal 
have considered questions regarding felony disenfranchisement laws).  Because the Supreme Court 
has never specifically articulated a standard for Section 2 claims in the context of felony 
disenfranchisement laws, “the legal standard applicable to felon disenfranchisement and other voter 
qualifications under Section 2 of the VRA is anything but clear.”  Id. at 701.  
 139 Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005); Roger Clegg et al., The Case Against Felon 
Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2008).  
 140 ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 135, at 887.  
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Clause is still an ineffective tool for challenging most felony 
disenfranchisement laws because it requires proof of intentional racial 
discrimination, which is notoriously difficult to prove.141  
 The Supreme Court addressed the Equal Protection Clause as applied 
to felony disenfranchisement laws in Hunter v. Underwood in 1985.142  In Hunter, 
the Court issued a unanimous opinion, holding that Section 182 of the 
Alabama Constitution, which disenfranchised those convicted of numerous 
enumerated crimes and “crimes involving moral turpitude,” was 
unconstitutionally adopted to intentionally discriminate on the basis of 
race.143  The Court acknowledged that deciphering legislative intent is a 
difficult task but noted that the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 
“was part of a movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to 
disenfranchise blacks” and that “[t]he delegates to the all-white convention 
were not secretive about their purpose.”144  The President of the convention 
even “stated in his opening address:  ‘And what is it that we want to do? . . .  
[T]o establish white supremacy in this State.’”145  Further, “the suffrage 
committee [of the convention] selected such crimes as vagrancy, living in 
adultery, and wife beating that were thought to be more commonly 
committed by blacks.”146  The Court limited the Hunter holding and reasoned 
that it did not conflict with the holding in Ramirez because Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not created to allow for intentional racial 
discrimination, which violates Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.147  
The Court noted that the Ramirez opinion did not suggest otherwise.148  
 After Hunter, voting rights advocates brought additional challenges to 
felony disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection Clause, but 
circuit courts have only rarely found state laws to have been adopted with 
discriminatory intent.  In 1995 in McLaughlin v. City of Canton, a district court 
in Mississippi found that the plaintiff’s assertion that the Mississippi 
Constitution’s disenfranchising provision was adopted with racially 
discriminatory intent had “credible support,” but it did not rule specifically 
 
 141 See infra text accompanying notes 151–70.  But see McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 
978 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (noting that the plaintiff’s equal protection disenfranchisement attack had 
credible merit).   
 142 471 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1985).   
 143 Id.   
 144 Id. at 229.  
 145 Id. (quoting 1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE 
OF ALABAMA, MAY 21ST, 1901, TO SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1901, at 8 (1940)).  
 146 Id. at 232.  
 147 Id. at 233.  
 148 Id.   
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on this issue because “the key points of this attack were not briefed, nor 
argued.”149  However, the court applied strict scrutiny to Mississippi’s 
disenfranchisement law and concluded that it violated the Equal Protection 
Clause to disenfranchise the plaintiff because of a misdemeanor conviction 
since the state had not demonstrated a substantial and compelling reason for 
its law.150  
 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit rejected a similar claim.  In Cotton v. Fordice, 
a then-incarcerated inmate challenged his disenfranchisement under the 
Mississippi Constitution, arguing that the provision which disenfranchised 
him was originally adopted with racially discriminatory intent.151  The Fifth 
Circuit held that “the state was motivated by a desire to discriminate against 
blacks,” but the subsequent amendments to the provision “removed the 
discriminatory taint associated with the original version.”152  Thus, while the 
Equal Protection Clause has produced more success than other litigation 
tools in the context of felony disenfranchisement laws, it is still an unreliable 
tool, along with Section 2 of the VRA.  
 The Natural Rights Center filed a lawsuit in Tennessee, the birthplace 
of the Ku Klux Klan,153 a year after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hunter, in 
the first felony disenfranchisement case after the VRA’s 1982 amendment.154  
The Natural Rights Center alleged violations of both the Equal Protection 
Clause and Section 2 of the VRA.155  In Wesley v. Collins, Charles Wesley, a 
black male who had been disenfranchised by pleading guilty “to a charge of 
accessory after the fact to the crime of larceny,”156 made similar claims to 
those in Hunter.157  He argued that a Tennessee statute that disenfranchised 
those convicted of “infamous crimes”158 was intentionally racially 
discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.159  Wesley also 
 
 149 947 F. Supp. 954, 978 (S.D. Miss. 1995).  
 150 Id. at 976.  
 151 157 F.3d 388, 389–90 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 152 Id. at 391. 
 153 Ku Klux Klan, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/ku-klux-klan (last updated Mar. 13, 
2019). 
 154 See supra notes 136–137, 142, 144 and accompanying text.  
 155 Ku Klux Klan, supra note 153.  
 156 Wesley v. Collins (Wesley I), 605 F. Supp. 802, 804 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), aff’d, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th 
Cir. 1986). 
 157 See id. (discussing the plaintiffs’ claims alleging that the Tennessee Voting Rights Act of 1981 denied 
them Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment Rights and rights secured under the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982).  
 158 Id. at 804.  The phrase “infamous crimes” was defined as felony convictions.  Wesley v. Collins 
(Wesley II), 791 F.2d at 1258. 
 159 Wesley I, 605 F. Supp. at 804. 
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argued that the statute violated Section 2 of the VRA because it “result[ed] 
in the unlawful dilution of the black community’s voting strength.”160  
However, a district court dismissed the lawsuit,161 and the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, noting that Wesley had not 
presented sufficient evidence to prove that the Tennessee legislature had 
acted with discriminatory intent so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 
nor had Wesley shown that the disproportionate impact on black voters had 
resulted from any state “qualification[s] of the right to vote on account of 
race or color” so as to violate Section 2 of the VRA.162  The district court 
noted that the statute at issue did not deny ex-felons the right to vote based 
on race but instead based on a “conscious decision to commit an act for 
which they assume the risks of detection and punishment.”163  
 In affirming the district court’s holding, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals went so far as to say that “the further discovery requested by 
plaintiffs would be in the nature of a fishing expedition for unspecified 
evidence,”164 even though Wesley had provided evidence of a history of 
official state-sanctioned discrimination and mistreatment of black people in 
Tennessee “marked by limited access to and segregation in the provision of 
health care, housing and education, and by sustained efforts to prevent blacks 
from registering to vote.”165  Wesley also showed that, as a result of the lasting 
legacy of that discrimination, “the ratio of white felons to the general 
population of Tennessee whites [was] approximately 1 to 1000, while the 
corresponding black ratio [was] 1 to 100.”166 
 Critics of the Wesley II decision have noted that “[b]y demanding proof 
that a disputed electoral practice was motivated by racial discrimination, 
[the] court reintroduced the ‘intent’ requirement that Congress enacted the 
[Voting Rights Act’s] 1982 amendments expressly to disavow.”167  In 
Wesley II, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals basically increased the proof 
requirement for a Section 2 violation from a “results” test into a variation of 
the Equal Protection Clause’s intent requirement, which renders Section 2 
essentially useless without evidence of a smoking gun, like the Equal 
Protection Clause.168 The Fourth Circuit followed suit in Howard v. Gilmore, 
 
 160 Id.  
 161 Id. at 814.  
 162 Wesley II, 791 F.2d at 1262–63. 
 163 Wesley I, 605 F. Supp. at 813.  
 164 Wesley II, 791 F.2d at 1262–63. 
 165 Wesley I, 605 F. Supp. at 804. 
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reasoning that:  
[A Section 2] plaintiff must establish that [the government’s] act either was 
intended to, or had the effect of . . . denying the right to vote based upon 
race. . . .  Virginia’s exclusion of felons from the franchise pre-dates the 
enfranchisement of African-Americans. . . . [and the plaintiff] failed to plead 
any nexus between the disenfranchisement of felons and race.169  
A causal “nexus” requirement is arguably a restatement of the intent 
requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.170  
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly requires a showing of 
intentional discrimination for a Section 2 violation.171  In 2010, in Farrakhan 
v. Gregoire (Farrakhan II), the court held that “plaintiffs bringing a section 2 
VRA challenge to a felon disenfranchisement law based on the operation of 
a state’s criminal justice system must at least show that the criminal justice 
system is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon 
disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent.”172  In Farrakhan I, the 
court held that “statistical evidence” of “racial disparities” in “Washington’s 
criminal justice system” could provide evidence of a Section 2 violation, but 
Farrakhan II held that Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I) “swe[pt] too 
broadly.”173  The court noted that felony disenfranchisement “takes effect 
only after an individual has been found guilty of a crime,” and that the 
criminal justice system “has its own unique safeguards and remedies against 
arbitrary, invidious or mistaken conviction.”174  The court went so far as to 
note that even the required showing of intent as applied to a felony 
disenfranchisement law might not “necessarily establish” a Section 2 
violation.175   
 Several circuit courts have held that Section 2 does not even apply to 
felony disenfranchisement laws.  In Johnson v. Bush, a 2005 challenge to 
Florida’s felony disenfranchisement provision of the Florida Constitution, a 
district court granted summary judgment to defendants, members of 
Florida’s Clemency Board.176  Plaintiffs claimed that Florida’s law had been 
adopted with racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause and had a racially disproportionate effect in violation of 
 
 169 Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).  
 170 HULL, supra note 29, at 108.  
 171 Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan II), 623 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 172 Id.  
 173 Id. at 992–93 (quoting and citing Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan I), 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
 174 Id. at 993.  
 175 Id. at 993–94.  
 176 405 F.3d 1214, 1215–17 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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Section 2 of the VRA.177  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s judgment, holding that plaintiffs were unable to provide 
the requisite showing of intent for the Equal Protection Clause claim.178  As 
proof of racial animus, plaintiffs had provided statements made after the 1868 
Constitutional Convention at which Florida’s felony disenfranchisement 
provision was adopted, but the court found that those racially biased 
statements were not adequately contemporaneous enough to prove racially 
discriminatory intent.179  Further, the court relied heavily on the fact that 
Florida amended and re-enacted its disenfranchisement provision in 1968, 
narrowing it to disenfranchise only those with felony convictions.180  Like the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cotton,181 the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals reasoned that, even if Florida’s disenfranchisement provision had 
been originally adopted with racially discriminatory intent, its re-enactment 
had cleansed it from “allegedly discriminatory” motives.182  The court 
declined to apply Section 2 to Florida’s law, reasoning that Congress had 
intended to “exclude felon disenfranchisement provisions from Voting Rights 
Act scrutiny.”183  The court distinguished felony disenfranchisement laws 
from other laws creating voting qualifications by noting that felony 
disenfranchisement laws are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and are 
a punitive device stemming from criminal law.”184  The court cited Ramirez 
and noted that “despite [Section 2’s] broad language, [it] does not prohibit 
all voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect.”185  
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that Florida had 
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 Similarly, in Hayden v. Pataki, a 2006 case which challenged felon 
disenfranchisement laws in New York under the VRA’s “results” test, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the VRA did not “encompass 
felon disenfranchisement laws.”187  In spite of evidence that New York 
disproportionately “penalize[d] black and Hispanic felons far out of 
proportion to their numbers,”188 the court reasoned that, even though a 
literal reading of the text of the VRA would likely apply to felony 
disenfranchisement laws, “[h]ere, there are persuasive reasons to believe that 
Congress did not intend to include felon disenfranchisement provisions 
within the coverage of the Voting Rights Act.”189  As evidence of Congress’s 
alleged intent to exclude felons from VRA coverage, the court mentioned: 
(1) the explicit approval given such laws in the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) 
the long history and continuing prevalence of felon disenfranchisement 
provisions throughout the United States; (3) the statements in the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committee Reports and on the Senate floor explicitly 
excluding felon disenfranchisement laws from provisions of the statute; (4) 
the absence of any affirmative consideration of felon disenfranchisement 
laws during either the 1965 passage of the Act or its 1982 revision; (5) the 
introduction thereafter of bills specifically intended to include felon 
disenfranchisement provisions within the VRA’s coverage; (6) the enactment 
of a felon disenfranchisement statute for the District of Columbia by 
Congress soon after the passage of the Voting Rights Act; and (7) the 
subsequent passage of statutes designed to facilitate the removal of 
convicted felons from the voting rolls.190 
 In a notable dissenting opinion, Judge Parker noted a relationship 
between mass incarceration, forbidden race discrimination, and voting, 
arguing that “the fact that felon disenfranchisement statutes may sometimes 
be constitutional does not mean they are always constitutional.”191  The 
district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 
rather than allowing for a summary judgment record, as Judge Parker 
preferred.192  Judge Parker argued that plaintiffs should at least be able to 
develop a substantive record.193 He reasoned as follows:  
Suppose, for example, [plaintiffs] were able to demonstrate that the 
dramatically different incarceration rates for minorities and Whites in New 
York were largely driven by drug convictions and reflected the manner in 
which law enforcement resources were deployed in the “war on drugs.”  
Suppose they showed that law enforcement officials (and task forces) 
 
 187 Hayden v. Pataki (Hayden II), 449 F.3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 188 HULL, supra note 29, at 108–09.  
 189 Hayden II, 449 F.3d at 315.  
 190 Id. at 315–16.  
 191 Id. at 345 (Parker, J., dissenting). 
 192 Hayden v. Pataki (Hayden I), No. 00-CV-8586, 2004 WL 1335921, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004). 
 193 Hayden II, 449 F.3d at 344–345 (Parker, J., dissenting).  
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concentrated resources on street-level users/dealers of heroin and crack 
cocaine in minority neighborhoods (because the problems were worse and 
arrests were easier in such areas) but, at the same time, devoted 
comparatively little attention to areas where Whites were abusing those same 
illegal drugs at the same rates (and powder cocaine at higher rates).  Suppose 
they also showed that Whites received probation three times as frequently as 
similarly situated Blacks or Latinos for similar crimes.  Neither showing is 
remotely beyond the realm of possibility in New York, and I believe this type 
of proof could constitute some evidence of a VRA violation.194 
 Judge Parker further cited the plain meaning of the statute as evidence 
that the VRA should apply to felony disenfranchisement claims,195 but the 
majority rejected Parker’s argument, reasoning that they “must . . . look 
beyond the plain text of the statute in construing the reach of its 
provisions”196 because the literal reading of the text would conflict with the 
intentions of those who drafted it.197  
 The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Hayden II majority in 
Simmons v. Galvin.198  In 2000, voters in Massachusetts adopted Article 120, 
which altered the Massachusetts Constitution to disenfranchise “currently 
incarcerated felons.”199  A group of incarcerated felons challenged the statute 
under Section 2.200  The court held that Section 2 did not apply to felony 
disenfranchisement laws, reasoning that “[w]hen we look at the terms of the 
original VRA as a whole, the context, and recognized sources of 
congressional intent, it is clear [that Section 2] . . . was not meant to create a 
cause of action against a state which disenfranchises its incarcerated 
felons.”201  When Congress amended the VRA in 1982, it did so “‘to make 
clear that certain practices and procedures . . . are forbidden even though the 
absence of proof of discriminatory intent protects them from constitutional 
challenge’ . . . . Felon disqualification was not” one of them, the court 
reasoned.202  The court expressly stated that it agreed “with the Second 
Circuit in Hayden that the seven circumstances203 it identifie[d] all necessitate 
 
 194 Id. at 345.  
 195 Id. at 346–48. 
 196 Id. at 315 (majority opinion).  
 197 See id. at 322–23 (“[W]e deem this one of the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute 
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’” (second alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989))).  
 198 Simmons v. Galvin (Simmons I), 575 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 199 Id. at 26.   
 200 Id.  
 201 Id. at 35–36.  
 202 Id. at 39 (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991)).  
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the conclusion that . . . this claim is not actionable.”204  Notably, in 2010, the 
Supreme Court issued a one-sentence certiorari denial and declined to hear 
the Simmons I plaintiffs’ appeal.205  Thus, it seems unlikely that the Supreme 
Court will resolve the circuit split on Section 2 anytime soon.   
 Accordingly, both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as applied to felony 
disenfranchisement laws are ineffective tools which have not worked to create 
mass systemic change.  The Equal Protection Clause’s intent requirement 
basically necessitates a smoking gun to prove purposeful and intentional 
racial animus as applied to felony disenfranchisement laws; the standard of 
racially discriminatory intent is extremely burdensome.206  As a result, very 
few challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws under the Equal Protection 
Clause have succeeded.207  In the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, proof of a 
Section 2 violation arguably requires an onerous variation of proof of intent 
in the form of a causal nexus.208  At the very least, both circuits have declined 
to invalidate felony disenfranchisement laws under Section 2 of the VRA.209  
The Ninth Circuit expressly requires a showing of intentional discrimination 
as proof of a Section 2 violation.210  In the First, Second, and Eleventh 
Circuits, Section 2 does not even apply to felony disenfranchisement laws, 
regardless of the disproportionate impact the laws may or may not have on 
protected minority groups.211  Both the Equal Protection Clause and Section 
2 require a fragmented and disconnected fact-specific approach to challenge 
felony disenfranchisement laws, and most courts have repeatedly shown a 
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B.  State Constitution Challenges 
 Challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws under state constitutions 
have fared similarly.  In a challenge to New Jersey’s felon disenfranchisement 
law, plaintiffs argued that New Jersey’s disenfranchisement statute, which 
disenfranchised “all people on parole or probation for indictable offenses,” 
violated the state’s equal protection doctrine under the state constitution.212  
Plaintiffs did not argue that the statute had been adopted with discriminatory 
intent but argued only that the New Jersey criminal justice system 
discriminated against African-Americans and Hispanics, “thereby 
disproportionately increasing their population among parolees and 
probationers and diluting their political power.”213  The Appellate Division 
of New Jersey’s Superior Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the 
complaint, reasoning that there was an express textual warrant for felon 
disenfranchisement in the New Jersey Constitution.214  The court noted that, 
if the statute had been adopted with racially discriminatory intent, it would 
violate New Jersey’s equal protection doctrine, but disparate impact related 
to a facially neutral statute was “an insufficient basis for relief.”215  
 In Iowa, Kelli Griffin challenged the loss of her voting rights after her 
conviction for delivery of a controlled substance.216  The Iowa Constitution 
disenfranchises those convicted of an “infamous crime.”217  She argued that 
her nonviolent drug offense did not qualify as an “infamous crime.”218  
However, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling and 
concluded that Iowa’s Constitution allows for disenfranchisement of felons 
“until pardoned or otherwise restored to the rights of citizenship.”219  The 
court noted that felony disenfranchisement disproportionately impacts black 
people and other racial groups but stated that “this outcome is tied to our 
criminal justice system as a whole and is not isolated to the use of the 
infamous-crime standard.”220  Further, there was no evidence that the state 
had adopted the “infamous crimes” language with the intent to discriminate 
based on race.221  The court said that it would be up to Iowa’s “future 
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democracy” to address the issues associated with felony disenfranchisement 
laws.222  
 Like challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the VRA, state 
constitutional challenges have failed to produce widespread systemic change.  
Additionally, even if future challenges under state constitutions led to 
restoration of voting rights for ex-felons in that particular state, it is unlikely 
that those results would be replicable because state constitutions vary widely.  
Thus, the necessity for nationwide uniform relief for ex-felons in the form of 
a federal statute is all the more imperative.  
C.  The Necessity of a Federal Statute   
 The traditional litigation tools used to challenge infringements on the 
right to vote have not succeeded at providing relief from archaic felony 
disenfranchisement laws.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause has resulted in a few victories, but the standard of proof of intentional 
discrimination is extremely difficult to meet.  Although some cases may 
present facts allowing for an Equal Protection challenge, those cases are few 
and far between.  Section 2 of the VRA held promise after the 1982 
amendments which altered the proof requirement from an intent standard 
to a “results” test.  However, courts have chipped away at Section 2 in 
subsequent litigation in the context of felony disenfranchisement laws so that, 
depending on the circuit in which a challenge is brought, Section 2 either 
does not apply to felony disenfranchisement laws at all, or the standard of 
proof is basically or expressly one of intent.  Challenges under state 
constitutions have also failed to provide long-term or replicable solutions, 
and a state-by-state approach is inefficient regardless of the potential relief 
under individual state constitutions.  Highly tailored litigation under each 
state’s constitution does not provide comprehensive relief.  Even legislation 
on a state-by-state basis is problematic; the issue of felony disenfranchisement 
should not be left to the states to individually legislate because it would likely 
result in a patchwork of relief from felony disenfranchisement laws which 
would leave ex-felons in certain areas of the United States with no solution.223  
 
 222 Id. at 205. 
 223 See, e.g., HULL, supra note 29, at 91 (arguing that “Congress alone can overcome the obstructionist 
and parochial interests that historically have prevented individual states from democratizing their 
voting procedures”); Lynn Eisenberg, States As Laboratories for Federal Reform: Case Studies in Felon 
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of states as “laboratories of democracy” encourages states to seek regional solutions rather than 
national ones and that the federal government is best suited to address the issue of felony 
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Thus, the best solution with the most potential for a comprehensive and 
uniform approach, the solution which would have the greatest impact by 
restoring voting rights to the most people, is a federal statute.224  
 In recent years, criminal justice reform has gained momentum and 
bipartisan support.  In the United States’ current political climate, there are 
very few substantive areas where Democrats and Republicans agree, but the 
importance of criminal justice reform is one of them.225  However, felony 
disenfranchisement laws are still a polarizing issue with laws varying widely 
depending on the state.  A few politicians have recognized the injustice of 
felony disenfranchisement laws and have voiced support for restoring voting 
rights to ex-felons.  In 2014, Republican Senator Rand Paul told a Kentucky 
State Senate committee debating an amendment to the Kentucky 
Constitution which would restore voting rights to some ex-felons that “[k]ids 
do make mistakes.  White kids make mistakes.  Black kids make mistakes. 
Brown kids make mistakes . . . [b]ut when you look at the prison population, 
three out of the four people in prison are black or brown.”226  Democratic 
 
disenfranchisement).  But see, e.g., Martine J. Price, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs. 
Litigation, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 369, 399–400 (2002) (arguing that a federal statute restoring voting rights 
would face practical and logistical issues and that “local legislators may be more likely to change 
state disenfranchisement laws because they operate on a smaller, more flexible scale and are less 
likely” to face public scrutiny).  
 224 Another option is a constitutional amendment, but a constitutional amendment is extremely 
unlikely.  The Constitution has been amended only seventeen times since 1791. Additional 
Amendments of the Constitution, BILL OF RTS. INST., https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-
documents/additional-amendments/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).  Many of the amendments to the 
Constitution have expanded voting rights.  Id.  The Fifteenth Amendment extended the franchise 
to ex-slaves, and the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments did the same for women and 
citizens eighteen and older, respectively.  See HULL, supra note 29, at 82.  Still, it is unlikely that 
restoration of the right to vote to ex-felons would garner the requisite support for a constitutional 
amendment because a constitutional amendment requires “a two-thirds majority vote in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate or . . . a constitutional convention called for by two-thirds 
of the State legislatures.” Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). At the 
beginning of each new legislative session during the 2000s, Representative Jesse Jackson Jr. 
proposed a right-to-vote constitutional amendment, which would have guaranteed the franchise to 
every American citizen over eighteen years old.  See HULL, supra note 29, at 87.  The proposed 
amendment eventually gained over fifty co-sponsors, but it still did not get much attention.  John 
Nichols, Time for a ‘Right to Vote’ Constitutional Amendment, NATION (Mar. 5, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/time-right-vote-constitutional-amendment/. 
 225 Noah Atchison, Bipartisan Efforts on Criminal Justice Reform Continue, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 
27, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/bipartisan-efforts-criminal-justice-reform-
continue. 
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Senator Cory Booker’s website notes that “[p]unishment is a vital component 
of our criminal justice system, but once someone has paid their debt to 
society, their rights as citizens should be restored.  Our country is strongest 
when all Americans have a say in the political process.”227  Several states have 
also made important reforms over the past few years.  Legislatures in both 
Maryland and Wyoming recently adopted legislation which automatically 
restores voting rights to ex-felons.228  Still, legislators’ past attempts at 
enacting a federal statute were unsuccessful, but as public support for 
restoration continues to increase, hopefully a federal statute will become a 
real possibility, although the constitutionality of such a statute is unclear.229  
 Congress may or may not have the authority to enact a statute which 
restores voting rights to ex-felons.  In 1999, Michigan Representative John 
Conyers introduced the Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, 
which aimed to restore the franchise to ex-felons.230  The Act never made it 
out of the Judiciary Committee.231  However, at a subcommittee hearing, 
Gillian Metzger, an attorney at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York 
University School of Law, reasoned that Congress has broad authority to 
regulate federal elections under the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 of 
the Constitution and the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.232  She argued that Congress has the power to restore voting 
 
felons.  Kentucky continues to have some of the harshest felony disenfranchisement laws in the 
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rights to ex-felons in federal elections through the Elections Clause because 
that clause “has been interpreted consistently to give Congress an 
extraordinarily broad power to regulate Federal elections.”233  Metzger 
further argued that the right to vote is a fundamental right, and that Congress 
“clearly has the authority to enact laws to protect the rights protected by [the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth] amendments.”234  She emphasized the importance 
of considering the history of felony disenfranchisement laws and their usage 
after the Civil War, “along with poll taxes [and] literacy tests” and argued 
that “history combined with the extraordinary disparate impact that these 
provisions have today should . . . clearly sustain a basis for concluding that 
Congress has the power to” enact legislation restoring voting rights to ex-
felons.235  
 However, Viet Dinh, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General under 
George W. Bush, maintains that Congress only has the authority to legislate 
the time, place, and manner of elections rather than voter qualifications.236  
According to Dinh, Article I:  
[E]xpressly differentiates between the “qualifications” of voters in House 
elections, stipulated in Section 2, which must be the same as the 
qualifications for voters for the most numerous body in the state legislature, 
and the “Times, Places and Manners” of such elections that is addressed in 
Article I, Section 4.237  
 Whether or not a federal statute restoring voting rights to ex-felons would 
be constitutional, reservations about the constitutionality of a federal statute 
should not stop Congress from taking action.  In Richardson v. Ramirez, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that arguments about felon 
disenfranchisement should be “addressed to the legislative forum.”238  The 
constitutionality of a law restoring voting rights to ex-felons would likely 
depend on the particular text of the law, and a federal statute is still the best 
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CONCLUSION  
 Although the history of felony disenfranchisement laws may be lengthy, 
the history of a practice does not establish its legality or righteousness.  When 
felony disenfranchisement laws were originally implemented in the 
American colonies, and after the Reconstruction era when 
disenfranchisement laws became more widespread, the incarceration rate in 
the United States was much lower.239  Thus, even if the Drafters of the 
Reconstruction Amendments originally approved of felony 
disenfranchisement laws and purposefully provided an express textual 
warrant for the practice in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the 
Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez,240 it is unclear whether or not 
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment would approve of the practice of 
disenfranchising felons today in light of the realities of mass incarceration.  It 
is unlikely that the Drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments would have 
imagined the federal government or the states’ governments criminalizing 
such a wide variety of behaviors, especially nonviolent behaviors.241  It is also 
unlikely that the Drafters would have anticipated that so many people would 
end up incarcerated and therefore vulnerable to the loss of the right to vote.  
Over 6 million people are currently prohibited from voting,242 which is more 
than the entire populations of Wyoming, Vermont, Alaska, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Delaware, and Montana combined.243  
 Mass incarceration disproportionately affects people of color.244  People 
of color are more likely than white people to lose their right to vote because 
of felony disenfranchisement laws.245  In a democracy, the disproportionate 
effect of mass incarceration on people of color, and the subsequent loss of 
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voting rights which incarceration involves, should not be tolerated.  Thus, 
whether felony disenfranchisement laws are intentionally racist or not, they 
are objectionable in unjustly diluting the votes of people of color.  Even 
though courts have generally held that disparate impact is not enough to 
challenge felony disenfranchisement laws,246 Congress should consider that 
disparate impact and adopt a federal statute that eliminates it.  
 People who have completed their sentences should not have to keep 
paying and repaying a debt to society in perpetuity.  If one of the main 
purposes of the criminal justice system is rehabilitation and eventual 
reintegration into society as a contributing member of society, the right to 
vote should not be restricted permanently.  Former felons should not need a 
law degree or an attorney in order to navigate the path to restoring their right 
to vote, and until the day the Supreme Court decides to revisit its ruling in 
Richardson v. Ramirez, it falls to Congress to develop a federal solution.  
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